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Accumulated evidence demonstrates the centrality of social psychology to the behavior
of members of the public as immediate responders in emergencies. Such public behavior
is a function of social psychological processes—in particular identities and norms. In
addition, what the authorities and relevant professional groups assume about the social
psychology of people in emergencies shapes policy and practice in preparedness,
response, and recovery. These assumptions therefore have consequences for the
public’s ability to act as immediate responders. In this Policy and Practice Review, we
will do three things. First, we will overview research on the behavior of survivors of
emergencies and disasters, drawing out key factors known to explain the extent to which
survivors cooperate in these events and contribute to safe collective outcomes. We will
demonstrate the utility of the social identity approach as an overarching framework for
explaining the major mechanisms of collective supportive behavior among survivors in
emergencies. Second, we will critically review recent and current UK government agency
guidance on emergency response, focusing particularly on what is stated about the role
of survivors in emergencies and disasters. This review will suggest that the “community
resilience” agenda has only been partly realized in practice, but that the social identity
approach is progressing this. Third, we will derive from the research literature and
from dialogue with groups involved in emergencies a set of 12 recommendations for
both emergency managers and members of the public affected by emergencies and
disasters. These focus on the crucial need to build shared identity and to communicate,
and the connection between these two aims. Including our recommendations within
emergency guidance and training will facilitate collective psychosocial resilience, which
refers to the way a shared identity allows groups of survivors to express and expect
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solidarity and cohesion, and thereby to coordinate and draw upon collective sources of
support. In sum, this evidence-base and the recommendations we derive from it will help
professionals involved in emergency management to support public resilient behaviors
and will help the public to develop and maintain their own capacity for such resilience.
Keywords: collective resilience, social identity, crowds, emergency, disaster, guidance
INTRODUCTION
Social psychology is critical to the behavior of members of the
public as immediate responders in emergencies, in three senses.
First, such public behavior is a function of group processes—
norms, relationships, and social identities. Second, what the
authorities and professional groups assume about the social
psychology of people in emergencies shapes policy and practice
in preparedness, response, and recovery. Third, these policies
and practices in turn impact upon the public’s ability to act
as immediate responders. The “disaster myths” of mass panic,
public helplessness, and inevitable disorder have been criticized
not only for being distortions of how survivors actually behave,
but also for rationalizing emergency management strategies
that undermine the public’s capacity for resilient behaviors
(1, 2). Recommendations based on assumptions of inherent
collective vulnerability in the public can serve to create this very
vulnerability (3): for example, the imperative “don’t tell them—
they’ll only panic” leads response agencies to restrict information
(4, 5). Providing information increases efficacy in the public (6);
in contrast, a perceived lack of information provision increases
public anxiety and distress (4, 7, 8).
Decades of research on collective behavior in emergencies and
disasters has shown that survivors often provide each other with
social support—both practical and emotional. Indeed, most lives
are saved by the “average” citizen, whether “bystander” or fellow
survivor, rather than by the professionals (9). Survivors have been
dubbed “professional and civilian first responders” (10), “zero
responders” (11–13), and “the fourth emergency service” (14).
They are typically willing to help, even if they don’t have specialist
skills. This mutual aid among survivors arises endogenously from
an interaction between social psychological factors and features
of the environment; but authority and responder actions can
support or inhibit the process, depending on their awareness of
how it works.
Since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center,
UK guidance on emergencies has reflected an increased
acknowledgment of this public capacity for resilient behaviors,
particularly at the community level, as well as greater recognition
of the need for such public involvement. However, recent critical
analyses (2, 15–17) have argued that: some of the guidance also
draws upon older models of public behavior in emergencies
according to which the public is inherently psychologically
vulnerable and uncooperative; conceptions of the social group
are typically underdeveloped or unexamined in the guidance;
therefore some of the practical recommendations in the guidance
conflict with both the principle and the evidence of effective
public participation in emergencies.
Given the importance of assumptions about social psychology
in emergencies, there is a need among both policymakers
and practitioners for an evidence-based theoretical framework
that: makes sense of the widespread findings of public
collective resilience; and is generative enough to enable practical
implications to be derived. Such a framework can provide
consistency and coherence to preparedness, response, and
recovery, and can enhance operations in each of these areas,
thereby contributing to saving lives. The social identity approach
in social psychology has increasingly begun to play this role
in civil contingencies planning, crowd safety management, and
post-disaster psychosocial care, and is therefore the focus of
this article.
The social identity approach (18, 19) began as an academic
theory of intergroup relations, and has been developed into
a set of principles for a range of applied settings including
organizational psychology, leadership, health behavior, clinical
psychology, and policing (20, 21). In the area of emergencies and
disasters, some of the recommendations deriving from the social
identity approach echo those derived from other frameworks
(or from practitioners’ experience)—in particular the value of
providing information and communication to enhance effective
citizen response (9, 22). But the social identity approach provides
a new rationale and new benefits for these good practices which
had not been suggested previously. A core principle for all social
identity based recommendations is that shared identity provides
individuals with strengths and abilities that they do not have
alone, and therefore that the role of the authorities is to support
or facilitate that shared identity. This can sometimes include
simply not getting in the way of the identity-based action of
crowd members.
This Policy and Practice Review will first summarize existing
research on the behavior of survivors in emergencies and
disasters, drawing out key factors known to explain the extent
to which survivors cooperate in these events and contribute to
safe outcomes for others. It will show how an early emphasis
in the literature on collective psychological vulnerability gave
way to theories focused more on adaptive sociality; and it
will suggest how the social identity approach provides an
overarching explanatory framework for the key concepts found
across the literature. Second, it will critically review what UK
government agency guidance says about survivors’ behaviors
in emergencies and disasters, comparing this with the research
evidence. Third, the article will specify 12 evidence-based and
actionable policy and practice recommendations. These will help
professional groups support public resilient behaviors as well as
help the public to develop and maintain their own capacity for
such resilience.
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FROM “DISASTER MYTHS”1 TO MODELS
OF ADAPTIVE SOCIALITY
The focus of the present article is those people directly affected
by emergencies and disasters—“victims” themselves, survivors,
and those under threat. While the phenomenon of “convergence”
is well-established (24) and indicates the critical role of non-
affected bystanders as immediate responders during emergencies,
there are two reasons for our focus on those directly affected.
The first is practical and the second is theoretical. Practically,
survivors and those threatened by the incident are close enough
to respond before anyone else. Therefore, they are particularly
important, and there is a need to understand and support
their actions. Theoretically, from the point of view of the
individualistic assumptions that dominate both academic theory
(25, 26) and everyday discourse (at least in the West), the
behavior of these survivors seems a puzzle: the idea that people
act as responders for others (often strangers) in incidents where
their personal self-interest is threatened requires explanation.
In the earliest accounts of human behavior in emergencies
and disasters, this puzzle was not properly investigated and
instead commentators drew on models which depicted behavior
in emergencies as a collective pathology due to survivors’
immersion in crowds.
Crowd psychology has thus been central to understandings
(and misunderstandings) of public responses to emergencies and
disasters. Yet there are a range of different crowd psychology
theories. Some of those most deeply rooted in public (and
professional) consciousness are poorly evidenced. More recent
crowd psychology theories are grounded in extensive social
scientific research, including not just observation but also
interview, questionnaire survey, and experimental studies.
“Mass Panic” and Other Collective
Pathological Responses
The earliest view of public behavior in emergencies and disasters
was that people in such events are prone to “panic,” meaning
impulsive, selfish, and uncoordinated responses. In this account,
the crowd is the conduit for this impulsivity and irrationality, via
“contagion” (27, 28). Mass panic is said to occur when a crowd
has only limited opportunity for escape from impending danger
(29). “Panic” supposedly explains the high numbers of avoidable
fatalities in emergency evacuations (30).
A second pathological psychological reaction said to occur in
emergencies and disasters is helplessness, or “disaster syndrome”
(31), which suggests that survivors are too stunned and passive
to care for themselves (9, 32). While there is evidence that 15
per cent of people “freeze” in emergencies (33), the suggestion
of collective helplessness is a stronger claim that passivity is a
generic response among survivors.
1The term “disaster myths” is standard in disaster sociology. However, we have
placed it in quotation marks to sound a note of caution. For example, those
numerous studies reporting an absence of mass panic do not in themselves falsify
the mass panic concept; as with Popper’s (23) example of the black swan, there may
yet be counter-examples.
Third, there is the suggestion that civil disorder is inevitable
in emergencies and disasters. In this account, in emergencies the
crowd operates as a “cloak” under which willful and uncontrolled
criminality can take place; emergencies and disasters “bring out
the worst in people” [(34), p. 556], especially antisocial behavior
(35), rioting, and “looting”2 (9, 38, 39).
Critique of the “Collective Pathology” Approach
In the disasters literature, these three claims about collective
response are called “disaster myths” because of the weight
of evidence against them (39–41). “Panic” as a claim about
default behaviors in an emergency has three problems. First,
there is the problem of determining whether survivors’ reactions
are unreasonable within an event where there is often limited
information (30, 40, 42, 43). In many cases, “panic” seems to
be a post-hoc judgement rather than an explanation of process.
Second, a number of detailed case studies (44–46) and reviews
of the literature (47–49) conclude that panic is “rare.” Third,
and most damning for the predictions of “panic,” but also for
the disaster myths of helplessness and disorder, is the consistent
evidence across different kinds of emergencies and disasters that
those affected often help each other and cooperate. This is not to
say that everyone cooperates or that all emergencies display equal
degrees of help; some emergency evacuations are characterized
by individualistic behavior and hence lack of coordination (30,
50, 51). Nevertheless there is a wealth of evidence that survivors
commonly give each other support in fires (52, 53), earthquakes
(54), hurricanes (55), and many other kinds of emergencies (56).
As well as acting to support other survivors, there is evidence
that survivors can be proactive in preventing further danger—for
example confronting attackers in terrorist incidents (57).
Pervasiveness and Practical Implications of Disaster
Myths
Despite the evidence against it, “mass panic” as a way of
characterizing behavior in emergencies is found in everyday talk
(42), news reporting (58), computer simulations (59), and in
the views of professional responders (1, 38, 39). “Panic” is also
evident in some official guidance, as we shall discuss.
This pervasiveness of “mass panic” and other “disaster myths”
is not just an academic matter. Critics have argued that these
notions have operated as rationales for inappropriate, inefficient,
and even dangerous forms of emergency management (31, 35,
60). Thus, the “panic” and “helplessness” myths are said to be
behind the ethos of mistrust in post-9/11 homeland security
policies in the United States (61, 62). Fear that the public will
panic has led to the withholding of information (4, 5) and is also
the reason that event stewards use code words to communicate
with each other that there is a fire or other threat (42, 63).
Likewise, overstating of the prevalence of “looting,” and indeed
more generally perceiving survivors’ actions as “disorder,” has
been shown to be highly consequential. For example, following
Hurricane Katrina these beliefs were used to justify a coercive
2We problematize the term “looting” in this context because it is often used to refer
not only to opportunistic burglaries but also to survivors requisitioning goods from
abandoned shops for survival (36, 37).
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rather than humanitarian response, resulting in many more
deaths (36, 37).
Models of Sociality in Emergencies and
Disasters
Within academic research, the accumulated evidence of survivors
acting as responders prompted new kinds of explanations
and models, superseding the “disaster myths.” Three kinds of
explanations for mutual aid among survivors in emergencies
have been proposed: emergent “disaster communities”; social
norms; and existing social relationships. Here we review the
evidence and argue that these three processes can to a large degree
each be understood in terms of our perception of ourselves as
group members, or shared social identity. We outline the social
identity approach and describe how it has been applied to mass
emergency behavior.
Emergent Disaster Communities
A number of researchers have suggested that the basis of
widespread helping in emergencies and disasters is due to the
emergence of a new social group among survivors, variously
called a “community of sufferers” (47), “therapeutic community”
(47), “altruistic community” (64), or “disaster community” (65).
The existence and function of these groups has mostly been
documented in the recovery phase (66–69), though there is
also extensive evidence that they arise in the acute phase of
emergencies (70, 71). Most of the work on them is sociological,
and where psychological mechanisms are discussed, a suggestion
is that disaster communities arise from perceptions of common
fate, whereby the shared experience of disaster causes previous
social group boundaries to dissolve (47, 71, 72).
Social Norms
A second explanation for supportive behavior among survivors
is in terms of social norms—that is, rules or guides to conduct
based on shared values. There is extensive evidence for the
role of norms among survivors in emergencies (73). Some of
these norms reflect pre-existing roles and rules that continue to
operate, even in “extraordinary” events (74, 75). Other norms are
constructed within the emergency itself (47, 76–78). Examples
include the finding that men attempted to help womenmore than
vice versa (i.e., gender role conformity) in the crowd crush at a
concert by The Who (74), and the greater assistance offered to
the elderly and infirm than the able-bodied in the Beverly Hills
Supper Club fire (79).
Existing Relationships
The third kind of explanation for the evidence of survivors
acting as responders is in terms of existing social relationships,
which provide obligations (52) and motivations (80, 81) to stay
with familiar others and to help them, even at risk to self.
Social capital [e.g., (82)], the major framework used in policy
for explaining sociality following disasters, emphasizes existing
social bonds. Social capital refers to the ways that trust and
reciprocity stemming from social networks can benefit people
(83–85). There is extensive evidence for the role of social capital
in disaster preparedness and community resilience (6, 86, 87).
For example, to guard against the effects of the tsunami that hit
Japan in 2011, neighbors with strong interpersonal connections
provided mutual support to each other by helping to place
sandbags in each other’s houses (88).
The Social Identity Approach
A fundamental idea of the social identity approach (18, 19) is
that, as well as personal identities (“me,” my personality etc.),
we each have social identities based on our group and category
memberships (e.g., women, Manchester United supporters,
lecturers). We have multiple group memberships and therefore
we have multiple social identities. Social identity is defined as
“that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his
[sic] knowledge of his [sic] membership of a social group (or
groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that
membership.” [(89), p. 69]. Each social identity is associated with
a particular set of norms, values, interests, and emotions; and
so when we define ourselves in terms of particular identities we
strive to enact and express the associated norms, values, interests,
and emotions. Different social identities each become relevant to
us at different times and contexts, as a function of who else is
present (19) and how they are behaving (including toward us)
[For more details, see (90)].
Crowds and Group Psychology From the Social
Identity Perspective
The crowd (including the crowd in a mass emergency) is a
particular kind of social group. It is an ad-hoc group where
people are face to face in a relatively unstructured situation.
The social identity model of crowd behavior (91) suggests that
in such crowds people don’t lose identity [as classical crowd
psychology suggested; (92)] but rather may shift from personal
to shared social identity. The norms and values—the definitions
of appropriate conduct—of that shared identity shape crowd
behavior, even in extreme or violent events such as urban
riots (93).
Not all crowds share identity, of course. Some are simply
individuals present in the same physical location—such as in
crowds of shoppers or crowds in transport hubs. But in those
crowds where people are with others they see as having the same
social identity as themselves, behavior becomes more intimate
and perceptions and expectations become more aligned: people
talk more, support each other, coordinate, expect agreement,
share emotion; these factors often make the experience an
enjoyable one (94).
Historically, crowd psychology theories have been
preoccupied with violent crowds (92). A critical point made by
the elaborated social identity model of crowd behavior [ESIM;
(95, 96)] is that one cannot properly understand conflictual
crowd behavior unless one takes context into account. Context
has two aspects. First there is the intergroup context, which
refers to the fact that crowd events often comprise two or more
crowds (for example a protest crowd and the police), and that
the relation between them can vary (in terms of both power and
perceived legitimacy). Second, there is the historical context. For
example, previous actions by the authorities might help explain
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crowd’s hostile reaction to the authorities’ present actions, even
where the authorities themselves believe they are acting fairly.
While most of these insights arose from the study of
conflictual crowd events, as we shall see some of their
implications can be carried across to the psychology and
management of mass emergencies. First, however, we show how
the three types of process described above—emergent disaster
communities, norms, and existing relationships—which have
largely been expressed in sociological or interpersonal terms, can
be developed through the framework of social identity.
Disaster Communities Are Based on Emergent
Shared Social Identities
Research suggests that shared social identity among survivors
is a crucial mediating mechanism between perceptions of
common fate and supportive behavior in emergencies (71,
97). Thus, an interview study with 21 survivors of different
kinds of emergencies (98) (including the sinking of the Jupiter,
Hillsborough football stadium disaster, Accra [Ghana] football
stadium crush, and the Bradford football stadium fire) found
that reports of shared danger were more common for survivors
that identified strongly than for those who identified weakly with
others affected. Further, whereas most of those who identified
strongly reported giving help, only a minority of people who
identified less strongly reported giving help.
Stronger evidence for the same relationship came from a
cross-sectional questionnaire survey of a representative sample
of 1,240 survivors of an earthquake and tsunami that took
place in Chile in 2010 (99). The study found that disaster
exposure predicted common fate, and common fate predicted
social identification with others affected by the disaster, but
there was no direct pathway between common fate and helping
behavior. Further, social identification with others affected by
the disaster predicted both giving emotional social support and
(indirectly, through expected support) participation in practical
support activities for the whole community. Similarly, post-
disaster surveys of adults and children affected by earthquakes in
Italy found that common fate predicted shared identity (100) and
that shared identity based on common distress predicted helping
intentions (101).
As well as being evident in “sudden impact” emergencies,
the same pattern has been found in the aftermath of a “rising
tide” emergency. The city of York, UK, was hit by storm Eva
in December, 2015, which resulted in the flooding of ∼350
houses and 150 businesses. Analysis of interviews with residents
conducted 2months later identified various factors that enhanced
perceptions of common fate (102). Directly and indirectly
affected residents stated that they came to see themselves as
sharing a community identity with others affected by the flood
due to the similar experience of an adverse event, due to suffering
from similar problems that followed the event such as looting,
and as a result of common struggles against the lack of the
necessary infrastructure. The emergent sense of community
became the basis for the provision of social support. Residents
reported providing others with practical support, such as helping
to move furniture to higher levels, and emotional support, such
as listening to others’ needs and comforting them. The same
relationship between common fate, emergent shared identity and
social support was found in a predictive model, based on survey
data from the same population (103).
The above evidence together suggests that shared social
identity is the psychological basis of disaster communities. This
notion was expressed formally in a social identity model of
collective psychosocial resilience in emergent groups (71, 97, 103,
104) (see Figure 1). Here, “collective resilience” refers to the way
a shared identification allows groups of survivors to express and
expect solidarity and cohesion, and thereby to coordinate and
draw upon collective sources of support, to deal with adversity
[(98), p. 502].
Social Norms Are Group Norms
The social identity approach suggests that social norms are
group norms. As well as societal norms which are widely
shared, different groups within a society each have different
norms. Some group identities place a particular value on charity,
solidarity or harmony (105), especially in particular identity-
relevant contexts—for example Muslim pilgrims at Hajj (106).
In the absence of such norms, salience of subgroup identities
may lead to less solidarity following disasters toward those seen
as outgroup members (107); but an ingroup norm of charity
or solidarity would increase the help offered to these outgroup
members. Some groups have more individualistic identities,
according to which personal independence might be normative
(108, 109). For example, group norms of individual “self-
reliance” are associated with reduced participation in coordinated
evacuations from hurricanes (110).
Further, commitment and conformity to particular group
norms is a function of commitment to particular group identities
(108). The comparative interview study described earlier (98)
found that those who strongly identified with fellow survivors
were more likely than others to report conforming to societal
norms and the rules of their role (e.g., teacher). Possibly
identification with a group defined only in terms of the
emergency context leads to greater conformity to norms and role
most relevant to the new group (71).
In relation to emergent norms, the Chile earthquake study
described above (99) found that observing emotional and
coordinated social support was associated with providing the
same kinds of support. Importantly, the connection between
observing others’ supportive behavior and providing support
oneself was stronger for those that identified with the category
of other survivors. This analysis is in line with Reicher’s (93)
argument that, in ambiguous crowd events, people look to others
as a guide to their own behavior insofar as these others are clearly
a member of the individual’s social group and as long as their
behavior doesn’t contradict existing group norms (111).
Existing Relationships Based on Shared Identities
Social capital approaches focus on networks of established
relationships, whether interpersonal or as part of groups, as the
basis of the trust and helping intentions required for supportive
interventions among survivors in emergencies [e.g., (88)]. The
social identity approach adds to this by suggesting that it is
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FIGURE 1 | Social identity model of collective psychosocial resilience in emergent groups.
our identification with these groups and social categories that
underlies trust and motivation to help.
For example, combining social capital and social identity
perspectives, Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh (112) found an
association between community belonging (their measure of
social identity) and trust in one’s neighbors. Group-based trust
in strangers who are members of an existing ingroup social
category has also been demonstrated experimentally (113) and
has been shown to increase helping intentions in bystander
intervention (114, 115), among those affected by a disaster [the
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake; (116)], and in terms of
charitable donations to those affected by disasters (117, 118).
More generally, for those with stressful jobs, identification with
one’s work-group has been shown to increase the social support
needed to reduce stress (119).
The social identity approach has a number of implications
for policy and practice, and hence is the basis for the
recommendations provided in this article. Before this, however,
we detail how the phenomenon of survivors as immediate
responders has been addressed in recent UK guidance on
emergency management.
ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING GUIDANCE
In this section, we summarize the findings of three recent critical
reviews of UK guidance on managing emergencies. We also
update these reviews by showing how two recent pieces of
research on social identity processes in emergencies—the first
on the July 7th London bombings and the second on mass
casualty decontamination for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents—have begun to change the
official guidance.
It is necessary to place the UK guidance in context by
briefly describing the key events and trends that have shaped
it and which have led to recognition of the role of the public
as responders. Two trends stand out as shaping UK policy
and practice in emergencies: the response to the threat of
terrorism since 9/11; and the effects of climate change (in
particular flooding).
The UK Context: Threats and Mitigations
The Consequences of 9/11
Before the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, emergency
planning was still informed by the experience of World War II
(120). After 9/11, as well as increased securitization of everyday
life, one noticeable development was that the term “resilience”
became particularly prominent in policy discourse. The UK
government sought to promote “resilience,” not only in response
to an increase in terrorist attacks, but also for attacks that were
qualitatively different from those of the past (including suicide
bombers and CBRN incidents, and more recently marauding
attackers and vehicle attacks).
Climate Change
Weather-related disasters are increasing (121) and climate
change is having direct impacts including through flooding and
heatwaves (122). For example, at the European level, temperature
increases of 1.5–3.0 degrees Celsius are associated with increased
flood risks in Central and Western Europe (123). The UK is
among the countries most prone to flooding (124) and flooding
is one of the major national risks in the UK in terms of both
impact and likelihood [(125), p. 8]. Around 5 million people
in 2.4 million properties in the UK face some risk of flooding,
with 330,000 properties facing a significant risk. This number is
projected to rise to between 630,000 and 1.2 million properties by
2080 due to the impacts of climate change (126).
The Civil Contingencies Act
In relation to both terrorism and floods, the increased threat,
and the likelihood that there would not be enough professional
responders immediately available for each incident, were factors
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 6 June 2019 | Volume 7 | Article 141
Drury et al. Facilitating Collective Resilience in Emergencies
that led the UK government to look increasingly to the
capacities of the public. The Civil Contingencies Act [CCA;
(126)] was the institutional response. The inclusion within this
civil contingencies framework of a programme of “community
resilience” was an explicit acknowledgment of the essential role
of informal public collective response (127). A recent guidance
document indicates the autonomy and agency envisaged in
the public:
Community resilience is about empowering individuals,
businesses and community groups to: take collective action
to both increase their own resilience and that of others; come
together to identify and support vulnerable individuals; take
responsibility for the promotion of individual and business
resilience (128).
Analysis of the UK Guidance
In this section we examine how social psychological processes
have been referred to in the guidance on emergencymanagement,
and the implications of these for policy and practice.
UK Emergency Management Guidance, From 9/11
to 2011
The analysis summarized here (2) covered publicly available
event safety or civil contingencies preparedness non-statutory
guidance produced in the UK. For the civil contingencies
documents, the start date was 2001, the year of the attacks on the
World Trade Center. For the health and safety documentation,
this boundary was extended to 1999, since some documents had
not been revised in that time. The end date was 2011.
A systematic internet search for open-access documents on
Google using keywords, plus prior knowledge of certain key
documents [such as the Purple Guide, (128)], led to a pool of
47 documents. Given the historical and practical importance
of the “panic” concept in emergencies, we word-searched
these documents for references to this word. Nine documents
produced positive results. We were also interested in how
informal public resilience was represented in the documents.
To achieve this, the same nine documents selected for “panic,”
plus those others in the pool (six) whose titles indicated that
they were concerned with resilience in the public, were discourse
analyzed. This entailed analyzing how a word or phrase was used,
its relationship with other concepts, and its functions or effects.
The 15 documents subjected to analysis are listed in Table 1.
While the fact that “panic” was present in roughly a fifth of
the documents sampled in the database of this study suggests
it is only a minor feature, the nature of what is said, not just
the quantity, is important. Characterizing behavior as “panic”
provides a set of expectations and assumptions that are different
from more neutral ascriptions (like “emergency egress,” “flight,”
or “rapid evacuation,” for example). Some of the documents
were explicit that it is collectives (especially crowds) that are
vulnerable to “panic,” which was implied to be emotional in
essence and so unreasonable. Some stated that, given this
collective psychological vulnerability, care must be taken by
those managing the emergency not to be open with information
to the public (129). While some of the myths about “crowd
panic” were openly challenged in some of the guidance, the
existence and nature of “crowd panic” itself as a phenomenon
remained unchallenged.
There was some reference to endogenous crowd resilience and
to support among strangers in three of the guidance documents,
in line with the evidence in the research literature. For example,
in the Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience
(130), one of the four types of community cited was a
“community of circumstance”:
These communities are created when groups of people are affected
by the same incident, such as a train crash. These groups of
individuals are unlikely to have the same interests or come from
the same geographical area but may form a community in the
aftermath of an event. Although this sense of community may
be temporary, some communities of circumstance grow and are
sustained in the long-term following an emergency (p. 12).
Yet this explicit recognition of the crowd of survivors as
responders was allocated only a small amount of space in the
guidance, and most of the recommendations for communities
referred to geographical communities.
In other places, however, even where the public and the
community were depicted as having some resilient qualities—
such as sociality and the ability to process information—they
were not represented as equal with the emergency services and
the other relevant formal organizations. Mostly, the public were
treated as essentially a recipient of public “services.” Rendering
the public as relatively passive and dependent functions to
exclude the public from equal participation and renders the
professional responders indispensable, which is inconsistent with
the assumption of a capacity for community resilience and the
need for such a capacity.
This position of relative passivity, and the separation of
the public from those for whom (most of) these documents
are addressed, is made explicit in the definitions of “Category
1” and “Category 2” responders in 2004 Civil Contingencies
Act, neither of which includes “the public” (131). One level
down from Category 2, the category “convergent volunteers”
represents the acknowledgment that members of public might
act as responders, but only subsumed under in the “Third Sector”
(charities, voluntary organizations).
CBRN Mass Decontamination Guidance, 2002–2016
Decontamination is a procedure undertaken to remove
contaminants from the skin of a potential casualty in the event of
a CBRN incident, and may involve quarantine and showering. As
the procedure involves removing clothes, in some circumstances
decontamination those affected may perceive decontamination
as more threatening than the CBRN incident itself. Evidence
from incidents of decontamination suggests that effective
communication is important in the management of incidents
involving decontamination; failure to communicate effectively
has resulted in increased public anxiety and reduced public
compliance with decontamination (132, 133), which increases
secondary contamination risk for those affected, receiving acute
healthcare facilities, and for the wider public.
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TABLE 1 | Documents included in analysis of guidance, 9/11 to 2011.
Source Year Document
Cabinet Office 2011 Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience
Cabinet Office 2011 Preparing for Emergencies: Guide for communities
Cabinet Office 2010 Emergency response and recovery: Non statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004
Cabinet Office 2004 Preparing for emergencies: What you need to know
Cabinet Office 2011 UK Resilience: Communicating risk*
Cabinet Office 2006 Evacuation and Shelter Guidance*
Department of Health 2009a NHS Emergency planning guidance: Planning for the psychosocial and mental health care of people affected by
major incidents and disasters: Interim national strategic guidance
Department of Health 2009b Developing psychosocial resilience: How to cope in a crisis.
Fire service 2003 National Guidance Document: Fire Service Mass Decontamination*
Health Protection Agency (HPA) 2008 CBRN Incidents: Clinical management and health protection*
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 2000 Managing crowds safely*
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 1999 Guide to Health safety and Welfare at Pop Concerts and Similar Events (Purple guide)*




2007 Major incident procedure manual (7th edition)*
London Resilience Team (LRT) 2009 London regional resilience flu pandemic response plan*
*Contains references to “panic.”
Table adapted from Drury et al. (2).
Carter and Amlôt (15) and Carter et al. (16) reviewed
decontamination the guidance for emergency responders,
identifying descriptions of public behavior and any
recommendations on how emergency responders should
manage the public. Searches were limited to documents on
decontamination which were available in the open literature,
and which were produced in English after the 9/11 attacks.
From keyword searches on Google and knowledge of the field,
19 guidance documents which met the inclusion criteria were
identified. These are listed in Table 2.
Frame analysis suggested that the guidance documents
focused predominantly on the technical aspects involved in
decontamination (e.g., developing and testing decontamination
equipment), with only 10 of the 19 documents including any
discussion of likely public experiences and behavior. Where
likely public behavior was considered within the guidance,
discredited assumptions such as disorder and mass panic were
common. As a result, the guidance emphasized the importance
of controlling members of the public (10 documents), rather
than communicating with them. There was a lack of reflection
in the guidance on the possibility that distress and resistance
from the public might be a function of the way the responders
were managing them, rather than due to the psychology of the
crowd per se.
UK Guidance on Floods and Community Resilience,
2006–2016
Given the threat of floods and importance of the community
resilience framework as a strategy for UK governments to
deal with their impact, Ntontis et al. (17) analyzed how
“community resilience” was represented in the guidance for
this type of disaster. Again what was of interest were the
ways that social groups and psychological elements were
portrayed, and the implications of these for practitioners
and policymakers.
Similar to the earlier reviews, search was limited to open
sources. A keyword Google search and consultation with experts
identified 71 relevant documents. After limiting the pool to
guidance documents that were issued by a UK government
agency or department, referred to floods as types of disasters,
and explicitly referred to community resilience, 28 guidance
documents remained that would be subject to discourse
analysis—see Table 33.
The analysis suggested that community resilience is
represented in official UK guidance on flooding at different
levels of complexity. Simple construals treated resilience as
merely the opposite of vulnerability, or as a static and reified
element that can be developed (by external agencies), but no
mechanisms or processes for its development were mentioned.
There was also a pattern of circularity within some documents
whereby the enhancement of community resilience was treated
as a mechanism for community resilience.
In contrast, some documents referred to specific elements
that can enhance community resilience, such as leadership,
communication, and collaboration between communities
and authorities, effective skill use, resource availability,
participation in emergency planning, and veridical beliefs.
As found in the earlier review (2), emergent communities
were mentioned (2011) but it was mostly pre-existing,
geographical communities that were the focus of community
resilience programmes.
3Documents of this kind are often revised; here we focused on the most up to date
version of each document.
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TABLE 2 | CBRN mass decontamination guidance documents, 2002–2016 included in analysis.
Source Year Document
U.S Army Soldier and Biological
Chemical Command
2002 Guidelines for cold weather mass decontamination during a terrorist chemical agent incident
Metropolitan Medical Response
System
2003 Rapid access mass decontamination protocol*
New Dimension Regional Team 2003 National guidance document: Fire Service mass decontamination*
Home Office 2004 The decontamination of people exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) substances or
material (2nd edition)*
Governor’s Office of Emergency
Services
2006 Multi-casualty mass decontamination guidance for first responders*
State Government Victoria 2007 Decontamination guidance for hospitals*
Health Protection Agency 2008 Generic Incident Management
HM Government 2008 Fire and Rescue Manual. Volume 2: Fire Service Operations. Incident command
U.S Army Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center
2009 Guidelines for mass casualty decontamination during a HAZMAT/ weapon of mass destruction incident (volume II)*
National Health Service 2010 NHS emergency planning guidance: The ambulance service guidance on dealing with radiological incidents and
emergencies
US Army Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear School
2011 Guidelines for military mass casualty decontamination operations during a domestic hazmat/ weapons of mass
destruction incident*
Department for Communities and
Local Government
2012 Fire and Rescue Service: Operational guidance incidents involving hazardous materials
NHS Scotland 2012 Guidance for hospitals on surface decontamination of self-presenting persons potentially exposed to hazardous
chemical, biological, or radiological substances*
Edgewood Chemical Biological
Center
2013 Guidelines for mass casualty decontamination during an HAZMAT/ weapon of mass destruction incident: Volumes
I and II*
Harvard School of Public Health 2013 Strategies for first receiver decontamination: A collection of tactics to assist hospitals address common challenges
associated with all-hazards decontamination of patients
Home Office 2013 Guidance for the United Kingdom emergency services on decontamination of people exposed to hazardous
chemical, biological or radiological substances*
International Atomic Energy Agency 2013 Public decontamination
National Ambulance Resilience Unit 2014 National Ambulance Service CBRNE/ HAZMAT guidance – OFFICIAL
US Department of Homeland
Security
2014 Mass chemical exposure incident: National planning guidance for communities
*Contains references to controlling the public
Table adapted from Carter and Amlôt (15) and Carter et al. (16).
Recent Developments: Including the Role of Social
Identity Processes in the Guidance
In this section, we bring the analysis of emergency management
guidance documents up to date by describing some recent
developments. Specifically, two sets of research studies have
been important for changing the guidance to include the role
of crowd members as responders based on (emergent) shared
social identities: on the July 7th London Bombings and on
CBRN decontamination.
The July 7th London bombings research in the guidance
The London bombings comprised three explosions on the
London Underground and one on a London bus in rush
hour on July 7th 2005. Fifty-six people were killed (including
the bombers themselves), and over 700 were injured. Many
survivors remained underground out of contact with the
emergency services for a period of time. The research comprised
interviews and an extensive corpus of secondary data, which
together provided accounts from 90 survivors plus 56 witnesses
(11, 134–136). Analysis found that most people were commuters
and were among strangers, but help was common and was
associated with shared social identity arising from common fate,
as described in earlier examples (98, 99).
The NATO guidance on psychosocial care for people in
emergencies and disasters (60) draws upon the evidence from
the London bombings study and the concept of collective
psychosocial resilience as part of the rationale for the Stepped
Model of Care. This embodies the idea of building on survivors’
psychosocial capacities for rapidly forming new social bonds
(rather than assuming them to be ill or helpless). The guidance
therefore recommends practical support, not psychiatric care, for
most people affected by emergencies.
The key principles of the NATO guidance (and references
to the London bombings research and the concept of social-
identity based collective psychosocial resilience), also informed
the Department of Health Emergency Preparedness Division’s
(2009) NHS Emergency Planning Guidance (137), as well as
Department of Health/NHS guidance on pandemics (138),
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TABLE 3 | Documents used in the analysis of guidance on community resilience and flooding, 2006–2016.
Source Year Document
Cabinet Office 2006 Emergency Preparedness: Non-Statutory Guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004
Cabinet Office 2011 Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience
Cabinet Office 2013 Emergency Response and Recovery: Non-Statutory Guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004
Cabinet Office 2013 Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders
Cabinet Office 2013 Responding to Emergencies. The UK Central Government Response. Concept of Operations
Cabinet Office 2016 Preparing for Emergencies: Guide for Communities
Cabinet Office 2016 Roles, Responsibilities and Partnerships to build Resilient Communities
Cabinet Office 2016 Steps for increasing Community Resilience
Cabinet Office 2016 The Context for Community Resilience
Civil Contingencies Secretariat 2013 The Role of Local Resilience Forums: A Reference Document
Committee on Climate Change 2015 Progress in Preparing for Climate Change. 2015 Report to Parliament
Committee on Climate Change 2016 UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017: Synthesis Report: Priorities for the Next 5 Years
DEFRA 2014 The National Flood Emergency Framework for England
DEFRA 2015 Flooding in England: Lead Government Department Plan
Department of Health 2009 NHS Emergency Planning Guidance: Planning for the Psychosocial and Mental Health Care of People affected by
Major Incidents and Disasters: Interim National Strategic Guidance
Environment Agency 2015 Under the Weather. Improving Health, Wellbeing and Resilience in a Changing Climate
Healthcare System Adaptation
Report Working Group
2015 Adaptation Report for the Healthcare System 2015
HM Government 2013 The National Adaptation Programme: Making the Country Resilient to a Changing Climate
HM Government 2015 Government response to the Committee on Climate Change: Progress on Meeting Carbon Budgets and
Preparing for Climate Change Summary Document
HM Government 2015 Meeting Carbon Budgets−2015 Progress Report to Parliament: Government Response to the Seventh Annual
Progress Report of the Committee on Climate Change
HM Government 2016 National Flood Resilience Review
London Resilience Partnership 2014 Communicating with the Public Framework v1.
London Resilience Partnership 2015 Strategic Flood Response Framework
Department of Environment,
Heritage & Local Government
2013 A Framework for Major Emergency Management: Guidance Document 11: A Guide to Flood Emergencies
NHS England 2014 NHS England Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR): Planning for the Management of
Self-presenting Patients in Healthcare Settings
Sustainable Development Unit 2014 Adaptation to Climate Change Planning Guidance for Health and Social Care organizations.
Sustainable Development Unit 2014 Module: Healthy, Sustainable and Resilient Communities
Sustainable Development Unit 2014 Sustainable, Resilient, Healthy People & Places
Table adapted from Ntontis et al. (17).
produced for staff. The London bombings study is also
referred to in the Cabinet Office (2012) revision to Emergency
Preparedness, chapter 7 on communicating with the public
(139), where it serves as part of the rationale for providing
information to survivors. The study’s finding that solidarity
is common also informs the National Risk Assessment, a
guide on risk and emergencies, which is used by Local
Resilience Forums across the UK to take into account
the psychological and behavioral impacts of disasters when
assessing risk.
Further, following the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing,
in which 23 people were killed and 139 wounded by a
suicide bomber as they left a pop concert, the Kerslake
report (140) on emergency preparedness recommended greater
“public first aid training” and “realistic contingencies for public
involvement. . . within all incident zones” (p. 154–6), citing
Cocking (11):
What the selfless actions of the multiple “zero” and first
responders. . . highlighted so clearly, is that casualty care at,
and evacuation from, incident sites should never be planned
as something that only fully trained, and expensively equipped
personnel should be relied upon to do [(140), p. 156].
This recommendation to upskill the public in first aid echoes
recommendations that were made after the London bombings
(14) and are reflected in a new programme currently being
planned (141).
New CBRN decontamination research in the guidance
CBRN mass decontamination represents a particular set of
operational problems, as described earlier. Compliance and
successful decontamination is not easy to achieve. Further, any
attempt at coercing the public would probably be unfeasible
(due to the numbers involved) and would certainly be
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counterproductive, as it is likely to reduce the legitimacy of
the operation in the eyes of the public and therefore escalate
collective conflict (142).
What is required, therefore, is not only for members of
the public to understand what is needed but to internalize
the goals of the decontamination procedure so that they are
motivated to engage and self-organize. Carter et al. (142)
developed hypotheses on how to achieve these goals through
harnessing social identity processes, based on research in related
domains of crowd behavior. Thus, work based on the ESIM
(95, 96) had shown that communication from police that
respected football fans’ identities, norms, and needs increased
perceptions of the legitimacy of police behavior among these
fans (143), as well as their identification with the police (144)
and subsequent compliance with police advice (145). Based on
this, a mass decontamination field exercise (146), an online
visualization experiment (147), and a mass decontamination
field experiment (148) each showed that when fire and rescue
personnel explained the importance of decontamination and
provided regular updates about their actions, this increased
perceptions of the legitimacy of the procedure. In turn, this
increased identification between emergency responders and
members of the public which predicted reduced public anxiety
(146, 147), reduced public confusion during the process (148),
greater public compliance, and cooperation (146–149), and
greater speed and efficiency of decontamination (148). In short,
the form and content of the communication changed the
relationship, rendering the professional responders as ingroup
and therefore leading the public to be more accepting of,
and engaged with, the decontamination procedure (which was
now understood as “our public health procedure” rather than
an imposition).
Changes to the guidance (internationally as well as in the
UK) following this research include reference to the key role
of communication (150) and to some of the recommendations
by Carter et al. on legitimizing responder behaviors (151, 152).
There have also been changes to UK Fire and Rescue Service
(FRS) decontamination practice, which have led to enhanced
performance, and changes to government thinking about CBRN
mass casualty decontamination (153). In short, these changes
represent a move from representing the public as an obstruction
to seeing them as a partner in the decontamination process.
Progress on Inclusion of Social Psychology in
Emergency Management Guidance
This review of the guidance is not comprehensive. However,
it has included the major UK guidance documents produced
since 9/11, and in particular on mitigations for a very important
terrorism-related threat (CBRN incidents) and for one of the
main risk factors in the UK (flooding). In recent years, there
has been progress in including reference to social identity
based recommendations in the guidance. However, this progress
has been uneven and inconsistent. Specifically, more needs to
be said about emergent disaster communities, their identities,
and group norms. Research shows that even for disasters
happening to geographical locations (in particular flooding)
the focus on geographical communities is insufficient, for
two reasons. First, there is often an unequal distribution of
damage and distress, which means that not everyone in the
geographical location suffers in the same way (72). Second,
the people that see themselves psychologically as a community
do not always correspond to the geographical community. For
example, Travelers, who normally live separately from settled
communities, came to be included in the York floods disaster
community while other locals were excluded (102).
The recommendation to provide the public with information
is now an orthodoxy across official emergency preparedness
and response guidance (2). This is undoubtedly a positive
development, as all contemporary theories of mass emergency
behavior as well as health behavior models (154–156) would
agree that people are meaning-seekers and makers; information
provides them with efficacy, reduces their anxiety, and empowers
them (8, 101). But there are still questions over whether this is
applied in practice, as many organizations still communicate in
code about emergencies (42, 63). A deeper understanding is also
needed of the social-psychological functions of communication,
and how it interacts with identity processes. These are some of
the points addressed in our recommendations.
TWELVE ACTIONABLE
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following 12 recommendations are derived from the research
above, but also from dialogue with communities affected by
disasters, and with professional groups and bodies involved in
emergency response—in particular the live events and crowd
safety industry, the CBRN community, the UK Fire and Rescue
Service, the Department of Health, Public Health England, and
the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. Some of these organizations
are already making use of social identity principles in their
practice. The recommendations are intended for all practitioners
and policy-makers involved in emergency planning and response,
including resilience officers; crowd safety managers, trainers,
and stewards; and the emergency services. Taking seriously
the notion that the public are often responders, we also make
recommendations that are relevant for the public themselves.
The section is divided into the three conventional phases of
emergency and disaster management in the UK: preparedness,
response and recovery.
PREPAREDNESS PHASE
Emergency Planners and Responders
Should Understand Group Psychology
Popular culture, mass media accounts, and some psychological
textbooks contain many wrong and dangerous assumptions
about mass emergency behavior based on discredited crowd
psychology—not only “mass panic” but also “contagion,” “de-
individuation,” “mob mentality,” and “stampede” (31, 34–36, 38–
41, 157–159). We recommend, therefore, that those involved in
emergency management prepare by developing their knowledge,
with a critical perspective—whichmeans appreciating that not all
theories of group psychology are equal, that some aremuch better
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 11 June 2019 | Volume 7 | Article 141
Drury et al. Facilitating Collective Resilience in Emergencies
evidenced than others. Specifically, there are four fundamental
lessons from research on group psychology which need to
be understood.
The first lesson is that panic (over-reaction) is rare in crowds
in emergencies (43–49). This means that collective over-reaction
should not be assumed to be a default. This does not mean that
people will not flee, or that some individuals won’t overreact, but
that fear and fleeing aren’t necessarily panic and that panic is not
a typical crowd phenomenon.
The second lesson is that social support among survivors
is common in emergencies (52–56). Not all emergencies are
characterized by support, and not everyone in those emergencies
is supportive. But support is common enough that it is widely
recognized as a regular pattern across emergency events, and
should be expected.
The third lesson is more specific to the social identity
approach and has to do with process. It is thatmuch of this social
support is due to shared social identity (71, 97). This points to the
need to understand, reinforce, and work with (not against) social
identity. This is the focus of the other recommendations below
The fourth lesson is that crowd behavior is a function of
the perceived legitimacy of other groups’ behavior. Therefore,
responders should understand that the way in which they manage
an incident will impact on public behavior (1, 96, 143–149, 160).
Plan to Work With, Not Against, Group
Norms in Emergencies
Given the importance of group norms in groups’ perceptions
and behaviors, and given that evidence shows that these norms
are maintained in emergencies, managers and professional
responders need to work with, not against, those norms.
For example, several aspects of decontamination in a CBRN
mass casualty incident—such as disrobing and showering in
front of others—go against general societal norms, and are
therefore likely to result in distress. Shared social identity
with others affected, and the development of a shared norm
around decontamination, may help to make these aspects of
decontamination more acceptable. We discuss in the sections
below how to facilitate such new group norms during an incident.
The point for preparedness is first simply to be aware of and
recognize these norms as a source of possible distress, and design
the procedure so that responders are seen to do as much as
possible to respect privacy.
For some groups, such as those from certain cultural or
religious backgrounds (e.g., Muslim women), being asked to
disrobe in front of others may be especially distressing (15,
161). Demonstrating that religious needs are respected results
in increased trust in responders, and increased willingness to
comply with treatment (162). Specifically, it is important to
plan for such religious needs by provisions such as gendered
showering (15), as well as working with local religious authorities,
who can help to identify solutions and get community buy-
in. Within this recommendation, therefore, is the requirement
for those professionals working with the public to have
sufficient cultural competence to recognize when some emergency
management procedures are a problematic issue.
Develop Evidence-Based, Pre-tested
Communication Strategies
We recommend communication for all three phases of an
emergency because communication can operate differently in
each phase. It is widely agreed that information provision
is important. However, for those involved in emergency
management, in the preparedness phase communication should
mean not just providing information but, crucially, listening.
Provide Pre-incident Information and Identify Trusted
Messengers
Pre-incident information can be provided in textual form [e.g.,
“Run, hide, tell”; (163)]. It can also be provided in the form
of drills to enhance procedural knowledge. For example, Fahy
and Proulx (164) suggest that drills following the attack on the
World Trade Center in 1993 meant that spontaneous evacuation
was much quicker and more efficient on 9/11 than in the earlier
incident. The use of both preparedness information whether as
text or through drills is premised on the assumption that, even
in stressful situations, people can still remember and process
some information.
However, the relationship between source and public is crucial
for determining whether information is trusted and internalized
(9). In social identity terms, trust is a function of the perceived
identity of the source in relation to that of the recipient. People
are more persuaded by messages from fellow ingroup members
than outgroup members (165–167), and especially by those
seen as prototypical of their ingroup (168, 169). Therefore,
those responsible for emergency preparedness need to prioritize
relationships—and specifically shared social identity—with the
community as part of their work of communicating—whether
in relation to flood plans, what to do in a chemical incident, or
general advice about a terrorist attack.
The first step in understanding and building relationships is
listening and learning.
Listen to and Learn From at-Risk Communities
Communication in the form of listening is a key element
in models of community resilience (6, 170), since it enables
understanding of those areas where social support is needed, and
increase the connectedness within and between communities.
Put differently, listening and learning enables two things: (1)
knowing/understanding identities (and hence norms) and (2)
relationship (i.e., shared identity) building.
Know community identities, understand their norms
Listening allows the authorities and professional groups to
recognize and understand the needs of the public and the
particular community they are supporting, which is in line with
a principle of Psychological First Aid [(171); see (172)]. In
social identity terms, this means getting to know the values and
norms—the identity (or different identities)—of the communities
in question. This is the equivalent in research on public order
policing to the recommendation to educate (oneself) (143).
Knowledge of group norms can shape particular risk
management strategies. A relatively mundane example from
the event safety industry illustrates the point. The moshing
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behavior of young people at music events might be interpreted
by someone unfamiliar with it as uncontrolled fighting. However,
more experienced observers understand that the practice has
clear rules and limitations on physical interaction (173)—for
example anyone who falls down is immediately picked up.
Therefore, rather than intervention to try to prevent moshing
(and potentially antagonize a crowd who expect to be able to
dance in this way) crowd safety management might involve
preserving a space for moshing as well as a separate space for
other kinds of audience engagement with the music.
Knowing a community’s identity and norms is also crucial
to enhancing and creating shared identity with that community.
For a positive relationship the identity needs to be properly
recognized (174).
Build relationships during emergency planning: build shared
social identity between communities and responders
There are many ways to build a relationship, and one important
strategy is inclusion (14, 124, 175, 176). Inclusive practices,
such as involving the public in planning, function to display
the authorities’ trust that the public can self-organize; it is
the display of trust that can foster shared identity (177) and
therefore encourage ownership and group efficacy around the
emergency/resilience plan (122). Therefore, include the public in
resilience planning.
For Communities: Form a Community
Group (103)
As we have seen, one of the basic effects of shared identity in a
group is social support and hence group efficacy, as well as safety,
health, and well-being benefits (20). This recommendation for
community members—for example in areas prone to flooding—
is that they form a group to develop preparedness, including
sharing information. Forming a group is advised for example by
the National Floods Forum (178), and hence is an established
recommendation in relation to flooding (122). Increasing feelings
of community control also seems to be associated with better
mental health outcomes; it helps identify and resolve secondary
stressors (82, 179); and it may help with communication with
authorities. What the social identity approach adds is that these
group identities should be meaningful and valued to people, so
that they provide members with identification, pride, continuity,
and efficacy (20). It can help for the group to have a name, a web-
presence (e.g., a Facebook group), and other signifiers of identity.
Responders can be invited to be part of these groups, though they
will still need to be led by community members.
RESPONSE PHASE
Prioritize Informative and Actionable Risk
and Crisis Communication
Often, the advice given to the public both before and during an
emergency is on emotions, or how to feel: “remain calm,” “don’t
panic” [e.g., (180)]. We are not aware of evidence that this kind of
advice either reduces unnecessary anxiety or increases the efficacy
people need in an emergency. Indeed, if people are already very
anxious, this advice is probably not enough to change that.
Moreover, if there is already mistrust between the public and the
authorities, advice that there is nothing to worry about might
itself increase public anxiety (3, 181). People require practical
information; this will help them to make informed decisions
(9), but will also meet their emotional needs and make them
less distressed (171, 172). However, before we explain how to
deliver this practical information, wemust again address the issue
of relationship-building.
Build Shared Identity Between the Public and
Responders Through Providing Information
In the response phase, relationship-building must be done under
time-pressure. Here we suggest that this can be done within
and through the provision of practical information, in a single
operation. We use here the example of CBRN mass casualty
decontamination to show how this can be achieved effectively.
As described above, a programme of work led by Carter
showed that effective communication by responders increased
public compliance during these crucial life-saving procedures,
enhancing the efficiency of the decontamination process, and
potentially reducing fatalities (146–149). Importantly, while
features of the communication (information on both the why
and the how of decontamination showering; respect; perceived
openness) predicted compliance and cooperation, they did so
indirectly, through perceived legitimacy and shared identity;
it was legitimacy and shared identity that directly predicted
the adaptive outcomes of efficacy, reduced anxiety, compliance,
and more efficient decontamination. The way information is
provided is a communicative act, that can convey fairness and
care. By conveying care around shared public health aims,
communication legitimized the decontamination process in the
eyes of the public, leading to shared social identification between
crowd and responders. In short, while effective communication
requires trust (165–167), communication strategies can also build
trust by building shared identity.
In practical terms, then, these findings testify to the
importance not only of scripting explicit instructions to the
public, but alsomakingmuchmore use of “soft skills”—including
eye-contact, mirroring, and using the public’s own language
(rather than official terminology)—as a crucial ingredient in
creating shared identity. These elements are therefore necessary
in the training and guidance for responders.
Carter et al.’s research led to four specific recommendations
on public engagement, now included as part of UK FRS
decontamination training: (1) show respect for the public’s needs
(which means listening for information on needs, as well as
using knowledge obtained in the preparedness phase); (2) be open
and honest; (3) provide health-focused information (why is the
procedure necessary?); (4) provide sufficient practical information
(15, 142, 160).
Use Human Voices Rather Than Bells and Sirens to
Communicate
The logic of the argument that communication can build shared
identity is that the mode of communication needs to be able
to convey identity-information. There is already evidence that
alarms in the form of bells are less effective in promoting
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evacuation than voice-based alarms and public address systems
(63, 182). The social identity analysis adds to the argument
for using voice-based alarms rather than bells and sirens, since
the former but not the latter can invoke shared identity (e.g.,
reference to “we” and “us”).
Communicate What You Know (and What You Don’t
Know)
Responders should provide information to the public in a timely
way, and should not wait until all information is known before
initiating communication; if information is not known, this
should be explained, and updates should be given when further
information becomes available (160). Providing information on
information (e.g., saying how what is known about an incident
has been established by responders) is another way of building or
maintaining a connection with the public.
Do Not Undermine Shared Identity During
the Response [(20) p. 128, (97)]
As we have seen (98, 99, 136), shared identity among
survivors often arises from features of the event itself—when
“all are in the same boat.” But professional groups’ actions
might (inadvertently) inhibit this process. For instance, on
public transport addressing people as “customers” (rather than
“passengers,” for example) stresses the money relationship which
has been found to encourage individualized and selfish behavior
(183). Addressing members of the public as separate individuals
may make personal identities more salient and so undermine the
natural processes toward shared identity (184).
Use Language and Instructions to
Facilitate Shared Identity
As well as consciously avoiding undermining shared identity,
there are actions that can be taken to support, scaffold or facilitate
the shared identity, both within the crowd and between the
professionals and the crowd, in addition to those described
above (section Build Shared Identity Between the Public and
Responders Through Providing Information).
For shared identity within the crowd, communications
with the crowd should refer to the relevant social category
(e.g., “One Direction fans”), use collective nouns (e.g.,
“community”), or use the group’s own name for itself (e.g.,
“metalhead”) to reinforce the collective identity (134). To create
or enhance shared identity between the crowd and professionals,
simple techniques include referring to “us” and “we” (rather
than “you”) when addressing the public, and referring to
common goals.
Accommodate the Public Urge to Help
(103, 140, 184, 185)
If survivors are “zero responders,” then this means a different
way of thinking about them and their role. Survivors (and
“convergers”) try to help (whether or not they have expertise)
(24). This has functions for the broader disaster community:
involvement builds unity and trust; and it can makes people feel
better. But the key point of course is that it is often necessary for
the public to respond, given the inability of sufficient responders
to reach survivors in time (9, 12), which means that it should
be accommodated where possible. Drawing on the situation in
Israel, where there is institutional support for citizens as “active
bystanders”, Adini (185) lists a number of specific functions
that survivors can perform, including reporting of the event,
reconnaissance, and even assistance with triage. In concrete
terms, accommodating the inevitable public urge to help could
involve setting up a system where survivor needs (e.g., “I need
to house my dog somewhere while my house is pumped out”)
can be matched with people with the relevant resources (e.g.,
“I have a big garden and can take in a friendly dog”). Local
community groups could organize such a system, with local
authority support4.
Recognize and Work With “Group
Prototypes” for Influence During an
Incident
An example of a near-disaster from the live events industry shows
how those managing safety can use knowledge of group identity
to facilitate a safe outcome (187). The Big Beach Boutique II was
an outdoor music event at which the number of people attending
(250,000) far exceeded the number planned for (60,000), which
led to a number of dangers. One of the risk factors included
some people climbing up lamp posts in front of the stage. It was
impossible, and in fact could have been counterproductive, to use
threat and coercion to get them down, since the stewards and
police were overwhelmed. Indeed, in the context of a free dance
music event, orders from figures of authority would probably
mean people doing the exact opposite. Instead, the crowd safety
personnel asked the DJ to intervene. In social identity terms,
the DJ was the ingroup prototype to the crowd, and so would
function as a leader for those who shared the identity of dance
music fans at the event. When he encouraged people to come
down from the lighting rigs, they did so peacefully, cheered on by
the crowd. Following this, no one else climbed a lighting rig for
the rest of the event, suggesting that the intervention had served
to instantiate a new norm.
4Israel provides many examples of institutional support for active bystanders in
emergencies. Other countries can learn from Israel about how to facilitate the
engagement of active bystanders. However, the present Review does not include
more material from Israel for the reason that civil contingencies arrangements
there do not easily carry over to other countries (186). Cole et al. (12) gives
an example in which the Magon David (Israeli ambulance service) give out
first aid kits to bystanders at mass casualty events. This works well in Israel as
emergency first aid is embedded in the national curriculum and all adults are
expected to do military service. In the UK, USA, and much of Europe, there is
no equivalent national service and the culture is very different. Experiences of
community resilience in Israel are framed very much in the context of the ongoing
intergroup conflict that has been present since the creation of the state of Israel
(and even before). Where a country is at war, it is much more likely that citizens
will identify with the state and engage with state-organized civil contingencies
measures, training, and so on (as well as the fact that all citizens learn these skills
as part of national service). While part of the argument we make in this Review
is that skills such as first aid should be supported in the ordinary public [as the
Kerslake report (140) recommends, based on our work (11)], ongoing conflict and
compulsory military service is not part of the UK context, and this is not likely to
change in the near future.
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RECOVERY PHASE
Maintain Active Communication With
Recovering Communities
In the recovery phase, as in preparedness, the recommendations
on communication refer to both providing information
and listening.
Keep Survivors and Families of Victims Informed
Timely and accurate information from the authorities has been
identified as a key aspect of community resilience (6), and this
is true in the post-disaster recovery period, when survivors
and the families of victims often have many questions and
require ongoing detailed advice and appropriate information that
targets specific needs. This renders the maintenance of proper
communication an imperative (139), and therefore again means
it is necessary for the authorities to maintain shared identity,
through the strategies indicated earlier.
Keep Listening to Recovering Communities, and Act
on This Information
Communities suffering from a disaster have a range of different
needs in the recovery period, and these needs can change over
time. Therefore, authorities need to keep listening to understand
these needs (188). We illustrate this with a recent example, the
Grenfell Tower fire, which took place in June 2017 [(189), p.
1] and killed 72 people, with hundreds more moved out of
their homes, traumatized, and distressed (179). After the event,
there were many donations. However, one of the locals affected
stated that:
resources have been thrown at people, but nobody actually
listens and ask the community members what they wanted
to have. People were being given massage, reiki treatment, or
art therapy right after the event; however, they were found
unnecessary because their basic needs were not assessed by
anybody (interview, 2018).
The problem of “convergence” can manifest itself as donations
that are unsuitable and which volunteers then have to spend
valuable hours sorting through (24). This activity takes away their
initiative by sapping their energy. In this case, what was needed
was for the outside public to listen more closely to the needs and
preferences of those affected and for the authorities to act as a
filter for donations, based on understanding these needs.5
Keep the Disaster Community Alive
When the sense of common fate declines in the recovery phase,
those affected no longer use the disaster to define themselves,
5Some in emergency planning would say that communities need eventually to
move on from the identities associated with the disaster, and that the decline
in such identities is therefore part of the recovery process. However, there is
an important distinction to be made here between different types of identities
associated with disasters. Where there is a “victim” identity in which “outsiders
cannot possibly understand” their suffering, the possibility of forming supportive
relationships to meet needs and go forward becomes closed off. But there are also
disaster communities whose “resilient” identities are defined broadly enough to
enable supportive external alliances—as discussed in our final recommendation.
and so shared identity also declines (103). Disaster communities
also run out of energy and resources (72), and their agency is
often undermined by interventions by the authorities anxious
to restore top-down “command and control” (37, 72). Yet
for disasters like floods, the continued problem of secondary
stressors in the recovery phase (190)—stressors like chasing
insurance, rebuilding one’s home, continued dislocation—
means that the support enabled by the disaster community is
needed more than ever, and responders and authorities should
facilitate this.
Yet research suggests that the emergent identities arising in
disaster can be sustained strategically. Put differently, as well as
arising from common fate in a relatively passive way, a shared
identity can be consciously and deliberately invoked through
various actions by community members.
Interviews 1 year after the York 2015 floods (Ntontis et al.,
unpublished) found that some people who experienced the
floods organized a neighborhood meeting to celebrate and
keep alive the sense of community that emerged during the
disaster. There were also plans to organize a summer street
party to celebrate the disaster community. Participants linked
ongoing social support to the ongoing sense of community
belonging they maintained through these events. Therefore,
the recommendation is to organize group events (103). To the
authorities, the recommendation is to facilitate the maintenance
of community groups. This means prioritizing supporting public
autonomy over restoring “command and control.”
The follow-up study of York flood-affected people found
that communication between residents acted as a way of
providing emotional support (103). But such communication
also reinforced and sustained the flood identity that was the basis
of such emotional support: when people met up and talked to
each other, they talked about their common flood experience and
self-definition. Therefore, the recommendation is that members
of disaster communities need to keep talking to each other as they
recover in the months after the disaster. Space and place are
important in this. A regular place to meet, such as a café or
social center, creates the opportunity for interaction, and helps
concretize the group as an entity.
Mobilize Wider Solidarity
The UK government guidance on the recovery phase (191)
defines it as the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating
the community following an emergency, but also states that it is
more than simply the replacement of what has been destroyed
[(191) section 5.1.3]. A disaster often brings to light needs for
change [(191) section 5.1.4]. Hazards become disasters through
human (in)action (192), and so some disaster communities re-
purpose themselves around a need for justice (193). Such needs
may be met through organizing to lobby those in authority.
Shared identity is the basis for such collective action (194), as it
allows people to act as one (91).
Here again we use the example of the aftermath of the Grenfell
Tower fire. In the aftermath of the fire, community members
formed their own groups that provided psychosocial support in
different ways using community spaces (195). Grenfell United
was a group created by survivors and families of victims to meet
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their immediate needs, but also to campaign for “safe homes,
justice, and change” (196, 197), reflecting the grievance that no
one was prosecuted for the deaths and many of those affected
were not suitably rehoused (198). They organized a regular
“Silent Walk,” which took the form of a march with placards
(like a protest) but in silence (as in a remembrance). The Silent
Walk served to create a visible, tangible unity (199) and enabled
people from around the country to show their support (200).
Participants explicitly defined those affected by the disaster as
broader than the 72 victims—since the flammable cladding and
issues of safety for those in social housing affected a much wider
group (201). This broad definition served to mobilize a wider
psychological community for justice and made Grenfell into a
national issue with which many people could identify.
These campaigning activities produced results for the
affected people, including ensuring that Grenfell residents were
represented as a part of the official enquiry (202, 203). Therefore,
the recommendation to those affected by a disaster is to mobilize
wider solidarity beyond the affected community (204).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Public health is politics, as a number of people have said, and
the phenomenon of members of the public collectively acting
as responders has a number of political dimensions. In the
first place, “resilience” in the public could be a double-edged
sword for those in authority. Ideally, informal collective resilience
in emergencies and disasters would mean independence and
empowerment in the public (6). Yet the more independent
and empowered the public becomes, the greater the possibility
that they develop aspirations the authorities didn’t anticipate or
wish for—including operating without need for the authorities.
The emergence of living “cognitive alternatives” (18) in disaster
communities was recognized in the earliest academic accounts of
these communities, which referred to the way the mutual aid and
democratization of relations within these events offered a glimpse
of a new kind of society (37, 47).
A further political dimension is also a first caveat. The idea
of public “resilience” can operate as an excuse for abnegating
government responsibility: “because they’re resilient, we don’t
need to provide support and resources for them.” In what
Chandler (205) calls “resilience ethics,” the political responsibility
of institutions is rearticulated as a need for the communities to
become more “self-aware” of their own “life-choices,” including
in relation to protecting themselves from environmental threats.
In the age of austerity, cuts to services aligning with the
supposed “big society” of public volunteers have left many
people more vulnerable (206). Furthermore, as Kaniasty and
Norris (72) argue, the effects of disasters are not distributed
equally, so those expected to be resilient by acting as public
responders may be those with least resources to do so. While
shared social identity gives unstructured crowds the capacity
to spontaneously self-organize, those in authority—emergency
services, local authorities, local resilience forums, official event
organizers, and safety advisory groups—have knowledge of the
risks (likelihood and severity), the emergency plan, venues and
locations, exit route capacities, and so on. They also have
resources. Therefore, they still have responsibilities.
A second caveat is that, in many disasters, survivors are simply
physically unable to help themselves let alone others (9, 74, 207).
Our 12 recommendations, like the existing guidance based on
community resilience principles, are for those emergency events
where there is some scope for public response.
In summary, the scholarly literature on mass emergency
behavior suggests that the public often act collectively as
responders in these events. Social psychological research and
theory is highly relevant in this, for it suggests that the emergent
disaster communities, norms, and existing relationships that
structure these spontaneous supportive actions can often be
explained in terms of shared social identities. The importance
of this for policy and practice is in terms of the implications
that can then be drawn for the ways that authorities’ actions
can facilitate or inhibit capacities for informal public resilience,
based on knowledge of social identity processes. The UK
guidance since 9/11 has increasingly recognized this informal
public resilience, though qualitatively and quantitatively there
are residual accounts of public behavior as either pathological
or passive, which conflict with the community resilience agenda.
Nevertheless, in recent years social identity research, which
offers an underpinning explanation of community resilience
and other public responder behaviors, has more explicitly made
its way into the guidance. Including our 12 recommendations
within emergency preparedness, response and recovery guidance,
as well as in training, will help professionals involved in
emergency management to support public resilient behaviors
and will help the public to develop and maintain their
own capacity.
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